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Abstract 
In this paper, we present two stylized models of the financial system. We make the case that 
in order to realize the potential of a well-functioning complete financial market, financial 
system designers and financial service providers will need to think about ways to deliver 
financial propositions that are customized to individual households by responding to their 
unique circumstances. This will entail the presence of proximate, well-trained providers that 
intermediate between the customer and those large “product manufacturers” whose goal is 
financial well being and not merely product sales. These providers would need to use 
expertise in financial advice or wealth management to develop integrated financial 
propositions for clients. We also highlight some of the important debates that arise in making 
this stylized financial system a reality. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
A household’s financial life can be seen as a combination of exposure to time and contingent 
states. Financial wealth can be seen as a combination of assets that are currently owned 
and the present value of future income discounted at an appropriate risk-adjusted rate. 
Financial services must help a household manage and increase its consumption smoothly 
and fully utilize its human capital, financial capital, and other resources to improve its well-
being. There are, therefore, two core functions that the financial system has to fulfill for each 
and every household: first, management of risk by movement of resources across contingent 
states, and second, intertemporal consumption smoothing by movement of resources across 
time. 
The outcomes of any financial inclusion effort must be benchmarked to these core functions. 
All financial products and services as well as institutions are means to achieve these 
outcomes in an efficient manner. Financial markets and institutions should evolve to promote 
complete markets that allow households to hedge future uncertainty by trading in every state 
of the world.
1 Consumers should be able to bundle together securities in portfolios to choose 
patterns of consumption expenditure over uncertain states of nature.
2 By enabling trade in 
insurance policies covering factors outside the economic system, financial services can help 
overcome the problem of uncertainty that prevents certain markets from coming into being, 
and allow the allocation achieved to be efficient and therefore welfare enhancing.
3
Financial providers can significantly help the household manage idiosyncratic risks. Financial 
contracts at regional levels may also protect against certain regional-level idiosyncratic risks 
(but systemic risks for the household) such as natural disasters. At a  greater scale, 
mechanisms could be developed that help countries globally pool and hedge risks, such as 
economic depression, rapid currency devaluation, inflation, and so on. It is argued that 
macrosecurities, traded at national, regional, and industry levels are critical aspects of a 
comprehensive risk management strategy.
 
4 Certain other risks, such as macrolongevity risk, 
challenge finance as a science to develop mechanisms to manage the risk, without simply 
increasing the buffer (risk capital).
5
The functions of a well-operating financial system would remain stable across contexts—
rural and urban, developed country and developing country, rich and poor.
 
6 These functions 
are universal, and they are particularly important for low-income households, who often 
constitute a good part of the financially excluded population. Low resource levels merely 
imply that while mistakes are expensive for everyone, they are far more so for low-income 
households that juggle many balls to survive.
7
                                                 
1. Arrow (1964) details how risky financial securities can help in risk management by allocation of risk bearing. 
Arrow and Debreu (1954) develop the idea of an integrated model of production, exchange, and consumption 
in a complete market. Debreu (1959) captures uncertainty by expanding the characteristics in the model used 
to define consumption goods by making them state contingent, where all possible future states of the world are 
defined by unique combinations of a set of environmental variables. 
 Though the functions remain stable, the 
products, delivery channels, delivery institutions, market infrastructure, and the regulatory 
and supervisory framework required to deliver on these functions may change significantly 
2. Financial securities play two important roles in spreading risk: they eliminate diversifiable (individual) risk from 
consumption expenditure and transfer non-diversifiable (market) risk across consumers. 
3. Arrow (2009). 
4. See Shiller (2003) for detailed discussions on such systemic risk and the macro securities to manage them. 
5. For a discussion on the importance of macro longevity risk and the extent of buffer required by pension funds to 
reduce the probability of underfunding, see Hari and others (2008). 
6. On the functional perspective of finance, see Bodie and Merton (1993); Merton and Bodie (1993, 1995, 2005); 
Merton (1995). 
7. See Collins and others (2009) for detailed discussions on households’ financial diaries that document financial 
activities at the household level. ADBI Working Paper 256    Rai, Ananth, and Mor 
2 
across contexts. The question is, how can the financial system help the households fulfill 
these functions in an efficient and orderly manner? 
In this chapter, we take the functions as a given and focus on the “how” question, 
considering the conceptual issues arising in an emerging market context, especially those 
related to product design, product delivery, and channel design. (Taking this to the next level 
of detail would require considering national and subnational contexts.) In the next section, 
we discuss two stylized approaches for delivering financial services, both with different 
implications for the roles and responsibilities of clients, providers, and regulators. In the 
subsequent sections, we highlight select issues with policy implications that should be 
resolved for effective financial inclusion. 
2.  TWO CONTRASTING BLUEPRINTS OF FINANCIAL 
SYSTEMS 
At the front end, where the interaction between the clients and the financial system happens, 
there are many approaches that the financial services provider could take with respect to the 
way the services are delivered to the clients. In a stylized sense, there are two types of 
approaches that could be taken: on one hand, the provider could follow a  hands-off 
approach, basically making a menu of products available; on the other hand, the provider 
could actively advise clients and take responsibility for that advice. Detailed descriptions of 
these approaches follow. 
2.1  Product Menu–Driven Approach 
This approach entails design and provision of several disaggregated, stand-alone products 
available from a variety of “product manufacturers” with a “thin” front end between 
manufacturers and clients. The front end in this system is typically an agent or distributor 
that markets the products to the customer. There may be functional overlap across products, 
but each product is sold as a discrete entity. In this approach, customers choose the set of 
products that makes sense to them, so there is heavy dependence on customers’ ability to 
understand a variety of products and process features. 
The extent to which the products have a positive or negative impact on the customer would 
depend on how well the customer can choose and use the appropriate product, within the 
eligibility constraints. So, under this approach, the need is to have a set of well-designed 
products and an army of agents. The misselling concerns (discussed in more detail later) are 
more around communication of information on product features. This approach characterizes 
most financial systems currently prevalent. It is easy to see how this scales for many 
products such as insurance, collateralized loans, mutual funds, and payment products. 
Hence this approach has dominated most efforts toward financial inclusion, which is often 
defined in terms of access to one or a few products. Interactions between the product and 
the nature of a household’s financial needs have been largely overlooked. 
2.2  Customized Financial Proposition Approach 
The alternative pathway is to develop and offer financial propositions (with underlying 
contingent claims) tailored to individual profiles, with effective and proactive risk selection 
and control.
8
                                                 
8. On the possibilities of customized financial propositions, see Aaron (1999); Bodie (2003); Bodie, Hammond, 
and Mitchell (2001); Merton (2001, 2002, 2003).  
 The back end here continues to be a variety of product manufacturers, but the 
customer-facing front end is a financial institution that is not defined by a product frame. ADBI Working Paper 256    Rai, Ananth, and Mor 
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In this interface, the provider would start with this question: given the balance sheet, goals, 
and risk preference of this household, how can I provide a financial proposition that helps it 
smooth consumption over its life cycle? The process would ideally start with the provider 
going through an intensive, structured interaction with the household that helps it understand 
the household’s current financial and human capital situation (see discussion below), 
understand the nature of uncertainties faced by the household, assess the risk and time 
preference, and document the goals and priorities of the household. Then the provider would 
create a financial proposition that would fit the household’s requirements. Presuming that an 
exact combination of products is possible, this should provide a kind of “wrapping” around 
the household, to protect it from risks, while helping move resources across time to smooth 
consumption.
9
The underlying structures in both these approaches are equivalent from the financial 
functions point of view, but they differ mainly in the process of designing and delivering the 
interface between the customer and the system. So the key difference is in whether the 
frontline provider’s focus is on the customer or on the product, and what the assumption 
about the customer’s expertise is. For example, if the household owns livestock that is a 
primary source of income, in both cases the mechanism to insure the animal would be 
available, but in the integrated proposition approach, it would be fundamental to any 
conversation with the individual, whereas in the disaggregated approach, the product would 
be available to be purchased at the discretion of the client. 
 
In the disaggregated approach, the household may be presumed to be the “expert” on 
choosing the right option, while in the former approach, based on the household’s expressed 
risk preferences and goals, portfolio allocation expertise is provided by the provider. This 
distinction and combining of these stylized approaches can have important implications for 
the eventual impact on a household’s financial well-being. This is an important strategic 
question for the future of financial inclusion, for policy as well as practice. 
Chapter 11 of this volume, by Alfred Hannig and Stefan Jansen, gives a good sense of the 
progress made in the financial inclusion efforts worldwide, and covers some of the important 
issues that the sector is currently dealing with to ensure expansion of financial access, as 
well as the implications thereof in terms of impact at the micro- and macro level. It is being 
observed that in countries like India, with the rapid rise of commercial microfinance, the 
viability of the product menu–driven approach is increasing, and institutions are expanding 
the range of services being offered.
10
In a way, this chapter complements the one by Hannig and Jansen by discussing issues 
related to the next stage in financial inclusion efforts and by looking beyond just making 
basic products available. In the next section, we discuss certain conceptual challenges and 
consider the two approaches for financial inclusion in light of these challenges.  
  
                                                 
9. As an analogy, one could take the example of a general practitioner in a health system who looks at the overall 
health of the people enrolled with it. The practitioner is not just selling services but actually looking at the client 
outcomes, with some shared responsibility with the clients and with the drug companies and other suppliers. 
The practitioner starts by understanding the clients’ health status, past illnesses, lifestyle, risk factors (like 
diabetes), and so on. Then she considers all these and the available solutions she is aware of, and prescribes 
a set of solutions that she believes would work for the client. 
10. See Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Morduch (2008) for a discussion on commercialization of microfinance and its 
implications. ADBI Working Paper 256    Rai, Ananth, and Mor 
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3.  SELECT CONCEPTUAL CHALLENGES IN FINANCIAL 
INCLUSION 
It is important to consider the implications of the two blueprints discussed above, and to 
evaluate their potential in terms of their implications for fulfilling the functions of finance 
efficiently and effectively. 
3.1  Designing Products: Simplicity and Complexity 
In the wake of the “subprime crisis,” there has been a lot of discussion about the complexity 
and simplicity of products, and how this affects usage and outcomes. The school of thought 
that places the onus of financial literacy on the customer is in a “race to simplify.” However, 
from a financial inclusion perspective, we worry that this significantly undermines the true 
potential of finance. Consider the following examples. 
Two of the ways for a farmer to finance her sowing operation could be through a crop loan 
payable in equal monthly installments, or through a crop loan where principal and interest 
payments are linked to the amount of rainfall obtained in her region. Clearly, for the provider, 
the first product is simpler to design, provide, and communicate. The latter is complex 
because it combines a loan with insurance-like features and will require the lender to hedge 
the rainfall risk at its level. At the time of disbursing the loan, the provider in the second 
instance would not be able to give the farmer a “simple” fixed repayment schedule. However, 
from the perspective of the functionality required for a farmer to manage volatile income 
streams, the latter appears to be a much superior alternative because the financial products 
absorb the volatility. In the first case, the volatility for the farmer is perhaps exacerbated by 
adding a fixed outflow to a very volatile cash flow, making the farmer worse off. In the 
second case, the provider uses its expertise to integrate a solution for the farmer, which she 
or he otherwise might not be able to create without such expert support. 
Often there are underlying assumptions about product pricing and design that the client may 
not be aware of, and the client’s decision may become impossibly complex to make. One 
example would be financing the retirement stage. The client would like to fulfill the function 
by entering into mechanisms that help him save money during times of income and invest it 
in a combination of assets so that an adequate amount is available during the retirement 
stage. He also would want to manage longevity risk and heath risk after the retirement, 
because both these risks may render the savings inadequate. There is expected selection 
bias priced into mechanisms to manage either of these risks.
11
Who does simplicity favor in cases like these? Disaggregated product delivery leaves the 
households with the responsibility for making decisions about product choices. Individuals 
and households are essentially looking to fulfill certain functions, which could be fulfilled by a 
number of product combinations, with varying degrees of efficiency and convenience for the 
household. Even if each product is individually easy to understand, together the products 
may pose a technically complex financial decision involving detailed asset allocation and 
estimates of the optimal level of goal financing required at different stages of life, including 
 An annuity would be priced to 
take into account the fact that a person who is not well would not want to purchase it, while 
the health insurance is priced with the opposite logic, that is, a person who is likely to fall ill is 
more likely to purchase it. Both are selection biases that offset each other to some extent, 
and bundling an annuity with health insurance (or long-term care insurance) should bring the 
price down for the household. So, even though it is simple for the provider to sell stand-alone 
health insurance (or long-term care insurance) products, most clients would not be able to 
understand the underlying logic of product design and actuarial calculation, and therefore 
would not be able to enter into the appropriate financial contract. 
                                                 
11. See Merton (2003) for a detailed explanation of this example. ADBI Working Paper 256    Rai, Ananth, and Mor 
5 
the savings for the postretirement phase. This is an important design issue for financial 
inclusion because the eventual effectiveness of financial inclusion would depend significantly 
on how the products are used by the households, which in turn depends on how the 
products are designed. 
3.2  Fixing Responsibilities: Provider’s and Client’s 
Responsibilities for Outcomes 
There is a need for a detailed assessment of the extent to which the different stakeholders 
could be held accountable for the client outcomes. In addition to the clients, there are four 
categories of stakeholders that could be held accountable: 
—advisors and/ providers of financial services, who interface between clients and the 
financial system; 
—risk aggregators and fund managers, who manage client portfolios; 
—third party agencies like rating agencies, which minimize the market information 
asymmetry; and 
—regulators and the central bank, which are responsible for the overall stewardship 
of the system 
Several debates on financial literacy have placed the onus on the customer to understand 
the intricacies of financial mechanisms, but there is insufficient emphasis on the capability of 
the provider and its preparedness for counseling customers on financial choices. How well 
trained is the customer representative of the provider in helping customers navigate complex 
life cycle finance choices? There is a case for placing much greater importance on provider 
and distributor financial literacy to ensure good customer outcomes.  
Instead of passing the responsibility entirely onto the clients, frontline finance workers could 
take the responsibility of analyzing household typologies based on risk profiles (high 
dependence on wage income, high volatility of cash flows due to rainfall risk), and use 
automated expert systems that match these profiles with financial portfolios (combinations of 
savings, investments, loans, and insurance mechanisms). The providers could use their 
expertise to build systems to implement a comprehensive process and support the financial 
decisions of their clients. 
Here is a detailed example of such a process. As a first step in financial planning, the 
provider could help the client visualize cash flows over time. Adding uncertainty to some of 
these cash flows would reveal potential stress points in the lifecycle of the client. The task of 
the provider is then to advise the clients so that they can protect themselves against 
catastrophic scenarios while ensuring that their goals are financed and a basic level of 
consumption is maintained across the lifecycle.  
Figures 1 through 3 visually represent the financial life of a household with four members: a 
husband (age thirty-four), a wife (age thirty-two), and two children (a boy age ten and a girl 
age eight). All persons except the girl (who will be married off) will be involved in wage labor 
from age twenty-one to age sixty. The man earns Rs.150 a day; the woman, Rs. 120 a day. 
All living, educational, and medical expenses are also included in the calculations. Figure 1 
shows the wealth paths for this household across the best and worst “states of the world” 
without any financial mechanisms. Please note that the x-axis represents years, while the y-
axis represents the wealth level at a point in time. 
 ADBI Working Paper 256    Rai, Ananth, and Mor 
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Figure 1: Life Wealth Envelope for Example Household without Any Financial 
Mechanisms 
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Source: Authors' calculations. 
Figure 2 shows the cash flow paths for this household across the best and the worst states 
of the world if life insurance is purchased for the earning members up to the extent of their 
human capital, and disability insurance is purchased to the extent of loss of human capital 
plus living expenses for the remaining years. As can be seen, the life wealth “envelope” 
becomes narrower and shifts upward, with the financial situation in the worst state of the 
world improving because the risks are insured against. 
Figure 2: Life Wealth Envelope for Example Household with Life and Disability 
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Source: Authors' calculations. 
Figure 3 shows the cash flow paths for the example household across the best and the worst 
states of the world if the family also buys an asset worth Rs. 100,000 fifteen years hence 
and makes Rs. 30,000 annually out of it, in a way extending its earning life beyond the 
working years of the earning member. ADBI Working Paper 256    Rai, Ananth, and Mor 
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Figure 3: Life Wealth Envelope for Example Household with Insurance and Financial 
Asset 
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Source: Authors' calculations. 
This example illustrates how a provider could use its expertise and household information to 
model the financial lives of clients and take responsibility for advising them about their 
financial decisions. Now, in this example, if the provider had advised this household to take a 
big loan without purchasing an adequate insurance policy, would this amount to misselling? 
Perhaps it would because even a cursory analysis by the provider could have shown the 
need for insurance in the household. In this instance, the situation is somewhat clear, but 
there may be cases where things are somewhat ambiguous. Defining the provider’s 
responsibility would require detailed assessment of what the provider can help the 
household with. The example just discussed shows that a provider may be able to do much 
more than what is presently being offered. This issue is further explored later in the context 
of communication between providers and clients. 
Provider skills and capability are one aspect of the story. Directly following from this is the 
issue of providers’ accountability, based on the roles they play vis-à-vis the financial decision 
making by clients, especially if a bad customer outcome obtains. 
Most product liability regimens go by the Latin maxim volenti non fit injuria, or “a person is 
not wronged by that to which he or she consents.”
12
There are factors in financial service delivery that might lead to bad customer outcomes if 
provider liability is lacking in the system. For example, there are financial products in which 
returns to the clients may suffer due to excessive speculation by the provider.
 Lack of consent is seen as the main 
ground for pressing legal liability against the provider. This paradigm has to be nuanced in 
the context of financial services. Unlike physical products, financial products lack visibility, 
and unlike many services, they reveal their real outcomes some time down the line from the 
time of purchase. The client has limited ability to assess ex ante the quality of the product 
and its impact. Consenting to a thirty-page contract written in complex language when all 
providers have similar looking contracts does not mean much. So the regulation has to start 
by setting fair ground rules to enable truly informed consent. There also may be a case for 
ex-post liability regimes in the context of financial service providers. 
13
                                                 
12. Geistfeld (2010). 
 Also, there 
are situations where the complicated underlying design of the product challenges the client’s 
ability to understand and analyze the risks associated with the product. There is also the 
possibility of a provider not disclosing the risks or losses clearly, that is, not making clients 
13. Bankers’ Trust is an example here, where speculation to increase returns led to losses for several clients. ADBI Working Paper 256    Rai, Ananth, and Mor 
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aware of losses that might occur in certain states of the world, or informing clients about the 
losses much later, when nothing can be done about them. Hence provider liability is critical 
when it comes to transparency and information dissemination of the financial products. 
Some of these factors probably can be controlled by enhancing providers’ liability, both ex 
ante and ex post, and therefore, the regulations have to be set accordingly to bolster the 
financial system. 
However, the imposition of excessive product liability may become so expensive for the 
providers that it impedes their active efforts to innovate for a client’s benefit.
14
It is not just the risk aggregators and providers of products that are liable; there are also 
other agencies playing important roles in connecting clients with the financial system. For 
example, the rating agencies’ role has come under much scrutiny in recent times. How can 
liability be fixed on them for their rating, which has advice implicitly embedded in the 
“product”? 
 Similarly, as in 
any product liability mechanism, the regulators would need to minimize misuse of the liability 
for making unreasonable claims. How can the incentives of the providers be aligned with the 
long-term implications for the clients in an efficient manner? The real challenge lies in 
ensuring that the products are well designed and that communication between the provider 
and the client is high quality from the customer’s perspective. How can one tell ex post 
whether a purchase was preceded by adequate understanding, and to what extent can the 
provider be held accountable for failure on this front? Clearly, the policymakers would need 
to start by closely examining how the industry manages the risks and uncertainty inherent in 
designing and commercializing products and processes. Subsequent to this, they should try 
to carefully draw lines between the liabilities of various stakeholders, including the 
regulators. 
The role of regulators and policymakers is to consider the overall financial system and 
ensure that its development proceeds in a stable and sustainable manner. Poor regulation 
can lead to inadequate management of systemic risk, which can lead to unfavorable 
outcomes at various levels in the system, including for the households. So, in some such 
cases, the responsibility would belong to the regulator and policymakers, and these players 
must find a way to compensate the household’s losses, after a due process of establishing 
responsibility.
15
The clients themselves have to be held responsible for the decisions that they do make in 
full cognizance. Here the key issues that may confound provider liability are, first, how to 
ensure that this regulation does not amplify moral hazard on the clients’ part, and second, 
how to know that clients’ behavioral biases did not lead to suboptimal outcomes. 
 This can be seen as a part of the responsibility of the regulator. 
3.3  Communication about Product Features 
As discussed earlier, the availability of multiple financial products presumes a fair amount of 
expertise on the part of the clients.
16 Most clients are not trained in finance, and the 
increasing complexity underlying the product contracts is difficult even for trained people to 
understand. Moreover, the product contracts have not done much to help the clients make 
the right choices. For example, credit card contracts have become so incomprehensible that 
the cost of understanding them may be quite high.
17
                                                 
14. This issue has been debated in other industries subject to rigid product liability regimes. 
 These challenges will be faced by those 
who are going to be financially included.  
15. See Giesen (2006) for an argument for treating the liability of supervisors as a regular form of civil law liability 
(either in tort or contract). 
16. For more on the challenges faced by customers in dealing with complex noncustomized products, see Merton 
and Bodie (2005) and Willis (2008).  
17. See Warren (2007) for a discussion on increasing complexity in product communication.  ADBI Working Paper 256    Rai, Ananth, and Mor 
9 
Understanding the process of communication between the provider and the client is 
important. There are essentially four ways in which the provider can communicate with the 
customer:  
—information: explaining the product features; 
—computation: helping the customer understand implications of a certain product 
or set of products in the specific context of the household;  
—advice: offering an integrated financial proposition to the client as an advice; and  
—decision: deciding on behalf of the client.  
In the first instance, the provider may just share appropriate product details with the clients in 
a transparent, easy to understand format. However, even if these details are provided, the 
household still faces the task of estimating the impact of certain product decisions on its life. 
This is primarily a challenge of estimation (of optimal liquidity requirements at different 
stages of life) and computation (the math about implications). In the second way of 
communicating with a customer, the provider may help the customer understand the 
implications of specific product decisions by doing the computation and simulation based on 
inputs received from the household. In the preceding section’s discussion on the 
responsibility of providers, a detailed example of such a computation and simulation tool is 
presented. Both of these kinds of communication exist in the product menu–driven approach 
to product design. 
The third kind of communication entails the provider developing an integrated financial 
proposition on behalf of the client, offering it as advice, and letting the client decide. In this 
alternative, the onus will be on the provider to explain the rationale for the advice. This kind 
of communication necessarily builds on “computation” that supports the development of 
advice to be given to the clients. 
In the fourth approach to communication, the provider decides on behalf of the clients. This 
alternative is actually not rare. It is crucial to highlight that defaults in products and bundling 
of products have advice built into them, in a manner that decisions are made on behalf of the 
clients. This is conceptually different from offering customized financial propositions wherein 
the proposition is provided as an expert’s “advice” and the decision is made by the clients. 
The rationale for last approach is often put in terms of the household’s limitation in making 
the right decisions. For example, self-control bias is given as a rationale for putting defaults 
in saving plans. Similarly, the microfinance institutions that bundle the life insurance product 
with the loan presume that the client would not purchase it and thus leaver the lender and 
family exposed to mortality risk. 
Since the household’s decisions may be shaped significantly by the method of 
communication, this issue is an important one when considering financial inclusion.
18
                                                 
18. Engelmann and others (2009) provide some evidence from neuroeconomics that people may follow “expert” 
advice on financial decisions even if it is suboptimal. Cole and others  (2009)  show  how psychological 
manipulations in product communication affect purchase decisions. 
 
Though the product menu–driven approach based simply on information may be easier for 
the provider, the client perspective needs to be carefully considered. Just providing 
information on products leaves the entire process of computation and (self) advice with the 
clients, who often lack the expertise or time to fulfill these functions comprehensively. In the 
integrated proposition approach, the providers would need to modify their client 
communication strategy by expanding the scope of communication from just offering product 
information to providing computational support and advice to clients. The decision itself may 
left with the clients, but the support from the providers would enable more optimal decisions. ADBI Working Paper 256    Rai, Ananth, and Mor 
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3.4  Behavioral Issues in Product Design and Delivery 
There is some evidence indicating that individuals may not be perfect consumption 
smoothers. People may not be smoothing consumption over individual lifetimes but rather 
letting it track income through the life cycle, spending more when earning more and 
spending less when earning less, even over the short term.
19 Various reasons have been 
cited for this observed suboptimal pattern.  An increasing body of literature argues that 
clients’ behavioral biases lead to suboptimal outcomes for them, challenging the assumption 
that individuals make perfectly rational decisions given their observable constraints.
20
Presuming for the time being that certain behavioral biases do exist, what then can be the 
response of the financial system? It could be argued that even when individuals do not 
behave in their own best interests, institutions may evolve to offset this behavior and 
produce a net result that is equivalent to the individuals behaving optimally.
 One of 
the most prominent of these is the self- control bias that leads to suboptimal saving and 
borrowing decisions for the client. Such behavioral biases also may lead to suboptimal 
outcomes from financial access, even when the providers have ostensibly done their job. 
21 This could be 
done by designing products and  processes that respond to the behavioral biases in a 
manner that induces individuals to select the right products that suit their behavioral profile. 
For example, commitment savings products and welfare-enhancing defaults in products may 
work for individuals facing self-control problems. Notwithstanding the potential merits of 
these possibilities, there are challenges inherent in this approach. It often entails making 
certain decisions on behalf of clients, and every such decision would require taking a 
normative stand on what will improve outcomes for individuals. For example, it is not obvious 
that reduction of consumption to increase savings is necessarily a good thing, and it is 
difficult to estimate when that would be the case without having a clear understanding of 
discount factors specific to individuals.
22
Between the two alternative approaches to financial services delivery discussed earlier on, 
the integrated proposition approach seems more capable of customizing solutions that would 
fit the characteristics of the household. Just like the provider would assess the risk 
preference of the household, it could also find ways to interact with clients who are 
sophisticated about their biases and offer solutions that help these clients manage their 
portfolios in an optimal way.
 Since there is diversity in the client group, clients 
should always be given a choice to self-select the right option. 
23 An individual who is sophisticated about his or her biases 
could benefit from such arrangements, but those who are naive about their biases may end 
up using these mechanisms suboptimally, and may even give the provider opportunity to 
exploit that naiveté, with adverse effects on the client’s welfare.
24
                                                 
19. See the study by Carroll and Summers (1991) on the relationship between income growth and consumption 
growth. For evidence on failure to smooth consumption over the short term, see Stephens (2003); Shapiro 
(2005); Huffman and Barenstein (2005). 
 This is a much debated 
issue in the realm of financial services delivery and requires some kind of resolution for 
defining the role of the provider in ensuring effective financial inclusion. 
20.  On behavioral issues that may impede optimal financial  decisions, see Tversky and Kahneman (1974); 
Laibson (1997); Loewenstein, O’Donoghue, and Rabin (2003); Thaler and Sunstein (2003); O’Donoghue and 
Rabin (2006).  
21. See Merton and Bodie (2005) for a conceptual discussion on how institutions can endogenously respond to 
behavioral limitations. See Thaler and Sunstein (2008) for examples and ideas on how “libertarian paternalism” 
could help individuals and households enhance their well being. 
22. Karlan and Morduch (2009) provide a detailed argument on this. Also see Mitchell (2005) for a broader set of 
arguments regarding the trade-off between welfare and liberty in s provider approach that preempts client 
behavior. 
23. On sophistication and naiveté in behavioral biases, see O’Donoghue and Rabin (2001). 
24. See DellaVigna and Malmendier (2004) on how sophistication or naiveté about self-control can affect contract 
design. ADBI Working Paper 256    Rai, Ananth, and Mor 
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3.5  Defining the Household’s Portfolio: Human Capital and 
Financial Capital 
The current frameworks of financial planning and portfolio allocation are almost always 
limited to financial assets. However, the financially excluded are often also the financially 
poor, for many of whom the most important asset for much of their lifetime is their human 
capital. It would be important to formally recognize the value and risk characteristics of 
human capital in portfolio allocation decisions.
25
These human capital characteristics should be incorporated in any portfolio allocation 
decision. The design challenge is how to ensure that this  happens.  If the menu-driven 
approach is taken, the household is expected to factor in the human capital characteristics 
while making the portfolio allocation decisions, whereas in the customized proposition 
approach, the characteristics would be understood by the provider and incorporated into the 
proposition. Even though the household is in the best position to understand its own human 
capital, it may not have the expertise to understand how this capital rates with financial 
capital and how it can optimize the overall portfolio. The household may not have access to 
the data and tools that could help establish the relationship between various components of 
its portfolio, including human capital. Here again, expertise may be required to understand 
the characteristics of the household’s human capital and advise the household on the basis 
of the overall portfolio it is managing, thus offering a customized financial proposition. 
 A landless laborer’s human capital will be 
very different from that of a school teacher, both in terms of economic value and risk profiles. 
The human capital of many workers in rural areas may be fairly uncorrelated with the stock 
market trends, and this provides diversification opportunity for the household. At the same 
time, the worker’s return on human capital is usually quite volatile, with equity-like features 
(but with low average returns as well), thus making it better for the worker to invest in debt 
instruments. 
3.6  Features of the Delivery Channel 
Though the functions of finance may be stable, the products, channels, and institutions 
required to fulfill these functions keep changing. The exact features of the ideal channel may 
change based on the combination of functions and product to be provided, but there are 
certain features of the delivery channel that may be synonymous with high-quality financial 
inclusion. It is almost axiomatic that the financial services channel should be able to provide 
the services in a convenient, flexible, reliable, and continuous manner.
26 Convenience and 
flexibility are required to make sure the delivery channel “fits” the needs of the clients. For 
example, low-income households have significant short-term consumption-smoothing needs, 
which could be fulfilled if they had convenient access to credit or saving facilities.
27
The presence of a well-designed channel induces important “state-of-mind effects,” both 
among customers and noncustomers. The fact that there is an easily accessible branch with 
a trained person offering services may signal reliability and continuity of access that could 
have a direct impact on the way households would make decisions. Inclusion is not just the 
opportunity to make explicit use of services but also the state of the mind that results from 
feeling completely included. This notion of inclusion may lead to effects even among 
 Low-
income clients also seem highly time sensitive and often prefer to pay relatively high interest 
rates for convenient and “doorstep” services. Reliability and continuity help the clients 
actively use the channel for implementing long-term financial decisions, especially when the 
clients are taking a risk on the institution (investment, insurance). 
                                                 
25. For discussions on this paradigm, see Bodie, Merton, and Samuelson (1992); Bodie (2002); Ibbotson and 
others (2007).  
26. Morduch and Rutherford (2003) discuss these features of the delivery channel. 
27. See Collins and others (2009) for a set of examples based on the financial diaries of poor households. ADBI Working Paper 256    Rai, Ananth, and Mor 
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nonclients that are attributable to the presence of the institution. Even for the basic model of 
traditional banking, there is some evidence from India that increased branch presence in 
previously excluded areas led to a decrease in poverty.
28
It may be argued that for complete financial inclusion, proximity of the channel to the clients 
is important to truly ensure high quality access. Physical proximity could be seen as a 
prerequisite to ensuring flexibility, reliability, convenience, and reliability. Now, if one 
juxtaposes this notion of a “proximate” financial services delivery channel with the two 
blueprints for a financial system, it seems that this channel design may be consistent with 
the design required to enable the integrated financial proposition approach. Such a financial 
services delivery channel would enable providers to think innovatively about customer 
needs, what products and services to make available, and the design of these products and 
services. Even though the product menu–driven approach could very well operate via such 
channels, the true potential of proximity would be realized better if the provider uses this 
proximity to apply the integrated financial proposition approach; otherwise, the 
understanding gained from such localization would be underutilized. 
 
The channel essentially comprises technology and people. Technology should be secure 
and efficient, and the same holds true for people. Much of the human resources used to 
reach out to the underserved in the emerging markets is characterized by underskilled and 
untrained agents acting as interfaces between the provider and the customer. There are 
issues around incentive alignment, but there are also issues regarding the skills and 
capabilities of the front-end providers. Even if the role of the provider is just to sell the 
products, the front-end staff should be fully versed in what is being sold. If advice is being 
given to the clients, the provider’s front end should have appropriately trained personnel.  
4.  SUMMING UP 
Financial services are very unlike physical products in their potential for customization and 
malleability. Intertemporal consumption smoothing can be provided either through savings or 
loans, with or without collateral. A loan can involve weekly repayment or bullet repayment; a 
loan when combined with rainfall insurance can allow for skipping a payment when the 
monsoon fails; a remittance inflow can be swept instantaneously as an account balance into 
a money market mutual fund. This malleable feature of financial services is what makes 
them so important for enabling people, particularly those who are low income, to be 
financially included in formal systems. 
In this chapter, we have presented two stylized models of financial systems. We make the 
case that in order to live up to the standards of a well-functioning complete financial market 
(in an Arrow-Debreu sense of the term), designers will need to think about ways to deliver 
financial propositions that are customized to individual households by responding to their 
unique circumstances.
29
                                                 
28. Burgess and Pande (2005). 
 This will entail the presence of proximate, well-trained providers 
that intermediate between the customer and those large “product manufacturers” whose goal 
is financial well being and not merely product sales. These providers would need to use 
expertise in financial advice or wealth management to develop integrated financial 
propositions for their clients. We have also highlighted some of the important debates that 
arise in making this stylized financial system a reality. 
29. Arrow and Debreu (1954). ADBI Working Paper 256    Rai, Ananth, and Mor 
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